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Chapter 1: Introduction
Migration is defined as the movement of people, either across an international border or within a State (International Organization for Migration, 2004) . There is no universally accepted definition of a migrant. However, there are characteristics that allow classifying persons that relocate internationally according to length, composition, and causes of their movement. Documented migrants are persons that enter in a country lawfully and remain there legally. Irregular migrants stay in a foreign country without satisfying legal requirements to do so. Skilled migrants are granted permission to stay in the host country due to special skills or abilities. Economic migrants leave their countries of origin to improve quality of life. The latter is commonly used to describe people that leave their country for the purpose of employment (International Organization for Migration, 2004) .
The tag of economic migrant also applies for those changing of employer, occupation, and job location, whether within the same city, the same country, or from one country to another, due to pecuniary reasons (McConell, Brue and McPhearson, 1999) . This study focuses on the workers that leave their home country in the search for better opportunities in the United States. The United States is selected as benchmark because its real income is relatively high and draws many migrants to it (Hanson, 2006) .
A commonly noted reason for economic migration is the income differential between source and host regions. Harris and Todaro (1970) develop a model to explain urban unemployment in less-developed countries. The model is based on an income comparison between rural and urban sectors in a given country and concludes that migration from rural sector to urban areas will take place while wages in the latter exceed those in the former. The study concludes that, in the presence of a fixed endowment of capital and labor, the only solution that leads to full employment in both sectors is liberalization of labor market since it will allow marginal productivity to determine wages. Corden and Findlay (1975) extend the Harris and Todaro (1970) model by introducing capital mobility among sectors, the possibility of economic expansion, and risk aversion.
It is assumed that even the so-called economic migrants respond to non-pecuniary incentives when they decide to change residence. The possibility of being hired and the ability to survive at subsistence levels while unemployed influences the risk aversion of potential migrants. Those same principles can be applied to international migration when workers are moving from one country to another, higher income economy.
There are different types of potential regulatory burdens that violate the free market assumptions in labor market. Examples include the hiring process, work days and hours, and the cost of dismissing workers. The purpose of this paper is to examine how labor market regulations may also influence of work migration to the United States. The assumption is that economic migrants are willing to incur the costs related to a change of residence if the labor market in the destination country performs better and offers a chance to improve earnings.
There are several studies on related topics that are examined in this study. Section 2 reviews some of the previous migration research. Section 3 of this document summarizes data employed plus sources. That section also offers an overview of the econometric model utilized. Section 4 discusses empirical results obtained. Section 5 offers policy implications. A concluding section finalizes the study.
Chapter 2: Literature Review
Most of the studies on migration approach the topic as a matter of investment. The human capital approach described by Sjaastad (1962) is largely employed in related studies. Both legal and illegal migration are affected by costs and gains associated with relocation. Factors that increase probabilities of being employed and raising incomes affect migratory flows positively. Sjaastad (1962) describes economic migration within the context of income disparities among regions within the United States. Migration costs and returns are categorized as pecuniary or non-pecuniary. Distance and number of dependents are among the pecuniary factors. Foregone earnings and psychic costs are among the non-monetary factors. Harris and Todaro (1970) study rural-urban migration in Africa. Rural workers relocated from rural areas to urban areas even when their productivity was higher in their place of origin. Institutionally imposed minimum wages in urban areas create expected earnings differentials. Those conditions lead to an equilibrium with high level of unemployment in urban areas. The analysis employs a two sector model in which both sectors trade output with each other and the rural sector also exports labor to the city.
An extension of that model is developed by Corden and Findlay (1975) . The study introduces capital mobility and economic growth to explain migration. The research also incorporates risk aversion in the model. Finally, the analysis eliminates the assumption of a close economy. It concludes that workers migrate from rural to urban zones when there are expected wage differentials. In this model, migration flows are positively correlated with the probabilities of being employed in urban areas.
Other studies also utilize to the human capital approach to analyze factors that might influence decisions to migrate. Yezer and Thurston (1976) employ the job-searching model to study behavior of migrants within the United States between 1955 and 1960.
Migrated distance is employed in the model as a proxy for information on the destination labor market. The study concludes that the probability of being hired in a new location, physical attributes of destiny and origin, and emotional ties might affect the return of migrants to places of origin. Greenwood (1985) conducts a survey of studies on migration, primarily within the United States. Cross-sectional models built with micro data, commonly gathered through surveys or sampling, dominate among analyzed studies due to a lack of time series on migration. Surveyed research tends to hypothesize that migration originates from disequilibria in labor and land markets that correct with migration. Some of the Other research employs the human capital model to study the effect of unemployment on the individual decision to migrate. Pissarides and Wadsworth (1989) present three hypotheses related to the correlation between unemployment and probability of migration. First, an unemployed individual is more likely to migrate than an employed one. Second, there is a positive correlation between migration and unemployment rate differentials between regions. Third, the correlation between overall unemployment among a set of regions and migration between those regions is negative. Datasets from the United Kingdom Labor Force Survey are used to estimate logit regressions for interregional migration in 1977 and 1984. Results confirm the first and third hypotheses, but empirical support for the second assumption is not obtained.
Gallardo-Sejas, Llorca-Vivero and Gil-Pareja (2006) employ a gravity model to examine the determinants of immigration into 13 European countries. In addition to traditional variables such as the size of the economy and distance from origin countries, dummy variables for qualitative variables such as common languages and maritime links are included. In the final model, the correlation between migration and population at the origin is positive, and correlation between migration and distance between origin and destination is negative. The correlation between GDP at the origin and migration is positive for lower income economies. The reason for that is that people in poorest countries do not have access to information from foreign labor markets, and they cannot afford costs of migration. That correlation turns negative at a certain level of income.
Much of the literature suggests that migration is a matter of economic development and labor market conditions. Some authors have studied the effects of regulatory burdens on income, economic growth, and unemployment. Fullerton, De León and Kelley (2007) test the hypothesis that excessive business regulation affects economic development.
A cross-section dataset of 114 countries is developed for the empirical analysis. GNI per capita is specified as a function of a set of regulatory measures in each country.
Variables employed in the study are reported by the World Bank in the Doing Business 2005 report. The study shows potential gains of $28.8 trillion as a result of at least partial deregulation.
A subsequent study on the same matter updates the dataset with the World Bank Doing Business report of 2008. That report includes information on regulatory burdens in 149 countries. New variables for construction licenses, tax burdens, international trade, and a dummy variable to classify countries by region are included in the analysis.
Somewhat surprisingly, endogeneity is not found to be present in the sample.
Outcomes are consistent with the previous study. Those outcomes show a loss of $27.83 trillion in the GNI per capita of studied countries as a consequence of the regulatory burdens (Licerio, Fullerton, and Clark, 2010 ). Labor force migration has been studied using several different approaches. There is broad consensus on the causes of migration. Distance between origin and destination, climate, and other amenities, plus the existence of immigrant networks at destination are found to influence rates of migration. Some other factors relate to labor market conditions. Unemployment rates and wage differentials are among these variables.
The influence of labor market regulatory burdens on migration has not been extensively analyzed. This study attempts to shed light on how labor market inflexibility may affect migratory flows.
Chapter 3: Data and Methodology
In 2010, 1.043 million people from around the world migrated to the United States (Organization for Economic Co-operation ande Development, 2012). The OECD collects data by means of correspondents appointed for each of the member countries.
Because these data are mostly obtained from official sources in every country, A Web site dedicated to cataloging languages of the world provides a list of all the countries in which English is the official or national language (Lewis, Simmons, and Fening, 2012) . The use of a common language is expressed in the specification by means of a dummy variable, giving the value of one to countries that use English as the official or national language and zero otherwise. The hypothesis is that people from countries that speak English as official or national language are more likely to choose the United States as a destination when to migrating.
The Doing Business 2011 report released by the World Bank (2012) contains data describing labor market conditions in several countries and territories during 2010. That information is employed in the model to control for the influence of those labor market policies on migratory flows. The hypothesis is that negative effects of regulatory burdens on income reported by Fullerton, et al. (2007) , and Licerio, et al. (2010) The difficulty of hiring category measures the restrictiveness of hiring workers under fixed-term contracts. A fixed-term contract is defined as a labor agreement that contains an expiry date or limited duration, even if the employee is performing a permanent task (World . Some countries prohibit these kinds of agreements for workers performing permanent tasks. Most of the countries in the sample allow temporary employment relationships for non-permanent endeavors, but limit maximum cumulative durations. Limits on the duration fixed-term contracts include contract renewals. The countries with restrictions of any kind on fixed-term contracts are assigned a value of one, the value is zero otherwise. It is anticipated that those restrictions cause labor market distortions, leading to underemployment and migration.
Restrictions on night work are part of the rigidity of hours. That is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the country imposes special restrictions on night work, or obligates the employer to obtain permission from a third party to assign activities to workers during evening hours. The variable takes the value of zero if night shifts are allowed without special permission requirements. Such restrictions may impede the employer from opening additional shifts and making production adjustments.
Another variable included in the rigidity of hours is the number of maximum work days per week allowed. Most of the countries in the sample allow 5.5 or six days per week.
Having more days per week allows the employer to respond to increases in demand and permits generate labor force flexibility. Allowing fewer working days per week is considered more restrictive. Conversely, it is assumed that the larger the number of mandatory leaves per year in a given country, the more rigid is its labor market Changes in demand faced by companies might make some activities redundant and, by extension, some workers. When the law recognizes redundancy as a cause for fair dismissal of workers, a labor market is assumed to perform better. Redundancy is the basis on which the Doing Business report calculates the difficulty and cost of dismissals.
Dummy variables are employed to indicate if an employer must notify a third party in order to dismiss a redundant worker. A value of one is assigned to the countries that impose such restrictions; zero is used for those that do not.
A value of one is also assigned to the countries that require permission from a third party to dismiss a worker. Values of zero are assigned to countries that do not require that. The model also includes dummy variables for the requirement of engaging with third parties for collective dismissals. The logic of value assignment is the same; one for economies that mandate the intervention and zero for those that do not. Similar to other variables, the presence of a restriction is expected to cause the labor market to underperform.
Difficulty to dismiss is also measured by the application of special rules to dismiss a redundant worker. Special rules might apply to dismiss workers under certain conditions such as seniority or being part of a minority. Existence of that kind of regulation is specified in the model by using another dummy in which the value of one is assigned to countries with special rules and zero for those not applying them. The existence of those rules is considered restrictive and expected to be positively related with immigration to the United States.
Employers are sometimes obligated to reassign or retrain workers before being able to declared redundancies. A dummy variable assigns the value of one to countries with that requirement and zero otherwise. That restriction is also expected to cause migration.
Dismissal costs under redundancy include the number of weeks that an employer must wait to dismiss a redundant worker after notification is rendered. The hypothesized In some countries, employers must notify redundant workers before the dismissal takes place. Gambia requires the longest period of time between notification and dismissal.
In that country, the employer has to notify the employee 26 weeks prior dismissals.
Employers are not obligated to notify employees about dismissals in 22 of the countries in the sample. On average, the countries in the sample require a period of 4.3 weeks between notifications and dismissals. In Greece, an employer that needs to terminate a worker on a redundancy basis must pay a severance equivalent to 24 weeks of the worker's salary if that person has been with the company for one year at least. Almost a third of the countries in the sample, 50 of them, do not require employers to make severance payments when they dismiss redundant workers with one year or less of tenure.
Employers in Sri Lanka are obligated to pay the equivalent of 97.5 weeks of salary as severance in order to dismiss a worker with 10 years of tenure. That is the highest amount in the sample and is 4.5 times greater than the value of the sample mean.
Workers with 10 or more years with a company can be released without severance payments in 34 countries in the sample. Bolivia and Venezuela do not allow dismissing workers on the base of redundancy. In order to keep those countries in the dataset, those countries are assigned values greater than the highest in the sample for each of the variables measuring costs of redundancy. Bolivia and Venezuela are assigned redundancy costs values that are three percent greater than the highest in the sample.
The United States is employed as the benchmark economy in testing the effects of labor market rigidities on migration. The hypothesis is that workers tend to move from restrictive labor markets to less regulated economies where there are better opportunities to work and/or increase incomes. Variables to control for traditional causes of migration include distance, income, language, climate, and stock of migrants are included in the equation.
( Table 3 presents four different regression equations. Those models include some of the variables listed in Table 1 . The models are specified using two different sets of variables. Given the differences in the order of magnitude among variables, each one of the sets is presented in linear and logarithmic functional forms. Because of the nature of the sample, a test for heteroskedasticity is necessary. The results fail to reject the null hypothesis of homoscedasticity, so OLS results are reported below.
Chapter 4: Empirical Results
Equation (1) and (2) The Deviance Information Criterion (DIC) is employed to compare the four equations.
The DIC is a combination of measures of complexity and fit that allows comparing specifications (Spiegelhalter, Best, Carlin, and van der Linde, 2002) . The DIC for the linear and logarithmic specifications are computed using the procedures employed by Xiao, Zarnikau, and Damien (2007) . Computed DIC values favor Equation (2). That specification contains eight variables in logarithmic form. In that model, seven of the coefficients are significant at the 90 percent confidence level or greater. Two of the coefficients present signs contrary to the hypothesis.
The results obtained for Equation (2), selected as the benchmark specification, validate many of the findings obtained in previous studies. STOCK is highly significant in all the equations in Table 3 , corroborating results reported in Hanson and McIntosh (2010) . (2006) . The results indicate that migration from countries at the lower end of GNI ratio increases until that ratio reaches a value of 1.01. After that point, the elasticity becomes negative and migration to the United States decreases 0.05 percent for every 1 percent increase in the GNI ratio. These results are consistent with the idea that people migrate to countries with larger income levels.
The other variable commonly included in migration research is distance between source and host countries. The coefficient estimated for DIST in Equation (2) says that a 1 percent increase in distance causes migration to the United States to decrease by 0.13 percent. The negative relationship between these two variables reinforces findings in previous studies on the matter (Yezer and Thurston, 1976) . In Equation (2) distance is statistically significant at the 90 percent confidence level.
The variable NOTICE accounts for the period of time the employer is obligated to wait after notifying the worker of the dismissal to make it effective. Its corresponding tstatistic value is significant at the 10 percent level. The elasticity of migration with respect to NOTICE is 0.066. All else equal, a 1 percent increase in the NOTICE term length leads to an increase of 0.066 percent in migration to the United States.
The mandatory number of vacation days in each of the 168 countries is included in the sample to describe the rigidity of hours. The results of Equation (2) indicate that LEAVE variable is significant at the 10 percent level. Coefficient computed in Equation (2) describes a 0.10 elasticity of migration to variable LEAVE. With everything else held constant, migration from a given country to the United States increases 0.10 percent per every 1 percent increase of the mandatory vacations period in the source country.
Regulatory limits on fixed-term employment relationships are another type of red tape affecting many labor markets. It is hypothesized to cause malfunctions to the market and, therefore, increase migration to better performing economies. Results in Equation
(2) do not corroborate the hypothesis, as the coefficient for FIX has a negative sign. Feldman (2003) in which firing and hiring regulations also fail to reach significance when used to explain unemployment.
Those two variables with coefficient signs contrary to those hypothesized are excluded in Equations (3) and (4) for comparison purposes. Eliminating those variables does not enhance the results and the respective DIC are higher than that for the benchmarking specification (2). Although labor market efficiency may be reduced and income performance damaged, risk aversion on the parts of workers potentially reduces outmigration in the presence of these contract term and dismissal regulations.
Different approaches to the study of migratory flows reaffirm the importance of both: i) distance from source to host countries and ii) income differentials on people's decision to relocate. The existence of migrant networks in a country is also confirmed as an attraction factor for people looking for places where to migrate. Equation (2) shows that, in the presence of aspects traditionally employed to explain migratory flows, labormarket regulatory burdens affect migratory patterns, even though not always as hypothesized. According to the results, effects of regulations that increase the cost of dismissals, and those imposing rigidity of hours foster emigration by causing the labor market to underperform. On the other hand, limits on a fixed-term employment relationship seem to help retaining people at their source country potentially due to worker risk aversion. The results are unable to establish a strong statistical relationship between bureaucratic difficulties to dismiss employees and the decision to migrate.
Chapter 5: Conclusions
Migration is generally regarded as an investment decision. Factors that affect costs of changing residence are some of the main catalysts behind relocation decisions. Nonpecuniary factors, such as climate, environmental amenities, and life cycle variables are also commonly employed to explain migration decisions. Labor market conditions with respect to: i) real or expected income differentials between source and host countries, and ii) the possibilities of being employed in the source and in the host country can also influence the decision to migrate.
A variety of studies quantify the negative impacts of regulatory excess on economic performance. Some regulatory burdens affect the economy as a whole and worsen income performance (Fullerton, De Leon and Kelley, 2007; Licerio, Fullerton and Clark, 2010) . Burdensome red tape has also been found to hamper labor market efficiency and lower employment levels below full capacity (Pissarides and Wadsworth, 1989; Feldman, 2003; Feldman, 2008) . Given these issues, migratory flows will potentially increase to less regulated, better performing economies.
Data from the Doing Business 2011 report is employed to describe labor market restrictiveness in 168 countries. Four models are specified to measure the effects of labor markets restrictiveness on migration to less regulated economies. Deviance Information Criterion (DIC) estimates are utilized to select the best specification for modeling migration to the United States. Results obtained confirm many of those reported in prior studies on migration. The existence of migrant networks at a given place is highly important (Hanson and McIntosh, 2010) . Distance, along with income differentials, also influences migratory flows (Sjaastad, 1962; Gallardo-Sejas, Llorca-Vivero and Gil-Pareja, 2006) . Outcomes regarding the effects of labor markets restrictions on migration are somewhat ambiguous.
Contrary to the hypothesis, restrictions on fixed-term contracts imposed by some countries seem to discourage migration. That result is potentially due to worker risk aversion (Corden and Findlay, 1975) . Institutional limits on redundant worker dismissals are not found to affect migration to the United States in a statistically significant manner. These results complement findings in Feldman (2008) , where difficulties of hiring and firing workers are reported to be unrelated to employment levels.
Links are found to exist between labor market regulatory burdens and migration in two cases. Those variables are rigidity of hours, as measured by mandatory vacation time, and the cost of dismissals. Estimated parameters for both of these regressors are greater than zero and satisfy the 10-percent significance criterion. Together, these coefficients imply that countries wishing to avoid unnecessary labor resource losses might benefit from allowing employers more freedom to adjust payrolls.
This study represents an early attempt to link labor market restrictions to migratory flows. Subsequent research may be able to add to this area of the literature by examining different types of migration. Examples include legal and illegal migration as well as skilled and unskilled labor outflows. The assembly of time series data would allow examining how changes in labor market legislation such as that recently adopted in Mexico can affect migration. Additional research on this topic appears warranted.
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